

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 301403

FOLLOWING REPEAT KABUL 8732 ACTION SECSTATE DEC 14.

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 8732

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SNAR, AF
SUBJECT: FY 1979 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL CONGRESSIONAL
PRESENTATION

REF: A. STATE 270843; B. KABUL 8529; C. KABUL 8045 ;
D. KABUL 8054; E. STATE 274785; F. KABUL 8122; G. KABUL 8308

1. INTRODUCTION: THIS REPORT CONTAINS THE FIRST PART (OVERVIEW)
OF KABUL'S SUBMISSION IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONS POSED IN
REFTEL A. ALMOST ALL NARCOTICS CONTROL FUNDS CONTRIBUTED
BY THE USG FOR USE IN AFGHANISTAN ARE CHANNELED THROUGH THE
UNITED NATIONS FUND FOR DRUG ABUSE CONTROL (UNFDAC), AND THESE
HAVE NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN OUR SUBMISSION. THE MISSION DOES
RECEIVE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL (INC) FUNDS FOR DEA'S
TRAINING PROGRAM HERE, BUT SINCE THE ARRIVAL OF REFTTEL A
COINCIDED WITH THE DEPARTURE OF THE DEA SAIC ON HOME LEAVE
AND HIS TDY REPLACEMENTS ARE IN NO POSITION TO PROVIDE THE
INFORMATION NEEDED FOR PARTS 2 AND 3, PERHAPS IN DEA/WASHINGTON
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CAN ASSIST WITH ITS PART OF THE SUBMISSION. WE DO STRONGLY
RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL FUNDING, AS
NECESSARY, FOR THE UNFDAC/UNDP CROP SUBSTITUTION PROJECT CURRENTLY
BEING DEvised BY UNFDAC (REFTEL B). SINCE THIS PROPOSED
PROGRAM IS FAR FROM BEING PUT INTO A DEFINITIVE FORM, HOWEVER,
AND WILL BE FUNDED THROUGH THE UN, WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION
TO SUBMIT A DETAILED PROPOSAL AT THIS TIME. (END OF INTRODUCTION)

B. KABUL A-51 AND KABUL 8045 REMAIN THE DEFINITIVE REPORTS
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THIS UPDATE SOME OF THIS INFORMATION IN THE FORMAT REQUIRED
BY REFTEL A.

3. GENERAL OVERVIEW.

A. THE PROBLEM. AFGHANISTAN PRODUCES OPIUM; AN ESTIMATED 370 TONS IN 1977. THIS AMOUNT, IF REFINED, WOULD BE ENOUGH TO SUPPLY MORE THAN THE ANNUAL HEROIN DEMAND OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE, AND REPRESENTS A SIZEABLE INCREASE OVER 1976 PRODUCTION -- DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN (GOA) HAD EARLIER GIVEN ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD MOUNT A MAJOR CAMPAIGN AGAINST PRODUCERS DURING THE LAST CROP YEAR. ALTHOUGH THERE IS STILL NO EVIDENCE THAT AFGHAN OPIUM OR ITS DERIVATIVES ARE REACHING THE AMERICAN MARKET, WE BELIEVE -- AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED -- THAT IT IS PROBABLY ONLY A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE THE COUNTRY BECOMES A SUPPLIER FOR OUR OWN DOMESTIC MARKET.

AFGHAN HASHISH AND HASHISH OIL IS A DIFFERENT MATTER; THEY ARE ALREADY ENTERING THE U.S. MARKET. THE SIZE OF HASHISH CROP THIS YEAR IS SIMILAR TO THAT OF 1976 -- ABOUT 400 TONS. FOLLOWING ESTABLISHED PRIORITIES, HOWEVER, THE MISSION HAS CHOSEN TO CONCENTRATE ITS PRIMARY NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORTS UPON THE OPIUM PROBLEM, AND HAS ONLY LIMITED INFORMATION AVAILABLE
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REGARDING HASHISH PRODUCTION, PROCESSING, AND TRAFFICKING. (INCIDENTALLY, ALMOST ALL DRUG-RELATED ARRESTS OF WESTERNERS IN AFGHANISTAN INVOLVE HASHISH -- RATHER THAN OPIUM.) WE CONTINUE TO BE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF A HEROIN-REFINING CAPABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AS KABUL A-51 AND KABUL 8045 PREDICT, AFGHANISTAN WILL PROBABLY BE PRODUCING SOME HEROIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

B. OUR INTEREST. THE PRIMARY GOALS OF THE AMERICAN MISSION (IN COOPERATION WITH THE UN, OTHER DONORS, AND THE GOA) ARE TO PREVENT AFGHAN OPIUM AND ITS DERIVATIVES FROM REACHING THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER MARKETS, AND, ULTIMATELY, TO TERMINATE AFGHAN PRODUCTION OF OPIUM PRODUCTS FOR THE ILLICIT INTERNATIONAL MARKET.

C. OUR STRATEGY. THE MISSION'S APPROACH TO COMBATTING NARCOTICS IN AFGHANISTAN IS TWO PRONGED: FIRST, TO DISRUPT TRAFFICKING AND MAKE IT DIFFICULT AND RISKY TO MOVE ILLICIT OPIUM INTO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CHANNELS; SECOND, TO ELIMINATE PRODUCTION ALTOGETHER. TO MOVE TOWARDS BOTH OBJECTIVES, WE SEEK A MAJOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES OF THE AFGHAN POLICE AND CUSTOMS SERVICES; THIS IS A SINE QUA NON IF TRAFFICKING IS TO BE DISRUPTED, AND IT IS AN INDISPENSIBLE ELEMENT IN ANY OPIUM CROP ERADICATION EFFORT.

THE AFGHAN POLICE ASSIGNED TO ANTI-TRAFFICKING DUTIES ARE LARGELY UNDERMANNED, UNDERTRAINED, LACK SATISFACTORY EQUIPMENT AND ARMS, HAVE LITTLE OR NO INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY, AND ARE PLAGUED BY A RATHER ERRATIC JUDICIAL FOLLOW-UP ON THE CASZA THEY DO COMPLETE. THE PRESENT PRIMARY EFFORT OF BOTH THE UNFDAC NARCOTICS ADVISORS AND DEA'S RESIDENT IIC IS TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF THE ANTI-SMUGGLING UNITS OF THE MINISTRIES OF INTERIOR AND FINANCE, THE POLICE ORGANIZATION. CONFIDENTIAL

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TIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING CONTROL. THE DEA SAIC -- WORKING THROUGH UNFDAC -- HAS CONCENTRATED ON IMPROVING THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY OF THE ASUS THROUGH A SERIES OF TRAINING PROGRAMS, AND THROUGH REWARDS FOR INFORMATION AND SEIZURES. WE HOPE, IN ADDITION, THAT WE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO ASSIST THE ASU'S, WITH THE PURCHASE OF EQUIPMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE, BUT NO DETAILED REQUESTS HAVE YET BEEN RECEIVED NOR COMMITMENTS OFFERED.

BOTH THE GOA AND THE MISSION CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN BEST CONTRIBUTE TO THE NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORT IN AFGHANISTAN BY CHANNELING OUR ASSISTANCE THROUGH UNFDAC. THIS MULTILATERAL CONDUIT IS POLITICALLY MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFGHANS -- AND AVOIDS GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT NARCOTICS CONTROL IS SOLELY A US-AFGHAN BILATERAL CONCERN. WE, IN TURN, WANT THE BROADEST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COMBATING NARCOTICS PRODUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN, BOTH TO MAXIMIZE RESOURCES AND MULTILATERALIZE THE PRESSURE UPON THE GOA TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE STANCE IN THIS EFFORT. UNFDI REINEINS THE BEST MEANS FOR COORDINATING AND CONSOLIDATING THIS INTERNATIONAL EFFORT.

D. PROGRESS TO DATE. IN PREVIOUS YEARS, VARIOUS GOA OFFICIALS HAVE MADE A NUMBER OF STATEMENTS REGARDING THE COMMITMENT OF THEIR GOVERNMENT TO OPIUM CROP ERADICATION. MISSION OFFICERS -- BEGINNING WITH AMBASSADOR -- AND HIGH-RANKING OFFICIAL VISITORS HAVE CONTINUED TO EMPHASIZE TO AFGHAN OFFICIALS AT EVERY LEVEL THE IMPORTANCE OF PREVENTING THE GROWTH OF OPIUM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN THOSE LOCATIONS WHERE THE GOVERNMENT HAS ACCESS AND THE CAPABILITY TO DO SO. AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE MISSION IS EMPLOYING THE USE OF ANTI-POPPY SIDE-LETTERS IN USAID AGREEMENTS (WHEN APPLICABLE) IN WHICH THE GOA FORMALLY UNDERTAKES TO PRO- CONFIDENTIAL

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HIBIT THE GROWTH OF OPIUM POPPIES WITHIN THE SPECIFIED PROJECT AREA.

THE GOA HAS CONTINUED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT WILL TAKE NO

DRASTIC ACTION TO ERADICATE THE POPPY CROPS UNTIL THERE ARE SUCCESSFULLY OPERATING INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS THAT WILL OFFER THE PRESENT GROWERS AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF EARNING A LIVING, I.E., A VIABLE, ATTRACTIVE CROP SUBSTITUTE. RECOGNIZING THE DIFFICULTIES THAT THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT FACES IN EXERCISING ITS AUTHORITY IN MANY OF THE REMOTER AND TRADITIONALLY LAWLESS REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY (WHICH, INCIDENTALLY, ARE ALSO THE PRIMARY CENTERS OF OPIUM PRODUCTION), AND THAT, INDEED, SOME ALTERNATIVES MUST BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE FARMERS IF THE PROGRAM IS TO BE SUCCESSFUL, THE MISSION HAS BEEN WORKING WITH UNDP AND UNFDAC ON THE FORMULATION OF A PILOT CROP-SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM IN THE UPPER HELMAND VALLEY (REFTEL B), DISCUSSED BELOW IN SOME DETAIL. IN EXECUTING THIS PROJECT, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT UNDP AND UNFDAC CONTINUE TO TAKE THE PRIMARY LEADERSHIP ROLE; IT IS JUST AS ESSENTIAL, HOWEVER, THAT THE UNITED STATES PROVIDE FIRM SUPPORT, AND THAT IT DEMONSTRATE THIS SUPPORT BY BEING PREPARED TO MAKE, AS NECESSARY, SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DIRECT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT THROUGH UNFDAC OR UNDP (PLEASE SEE REFTEL D). WE UNDERSTAND THAT OTHER POTENTIAL FOREIGN DONORS, SUCH AS IRAN, WOULD BE APPROACHED FIRST. WE SHOULD HAVE NO ILLUSIONS, HOWEVER, THAT CROP SUBSTITUTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS WILL HAVE MUCH IMPACT IN THE ABSENCE OF A MAJOR ENFORCEMENT EFFORT -- BECAUSE THERE IS SIMPLY NO CROP, OTHER THAN OPIUM, THAT CAN PROVIDE A SIMILAR DEGREE OF INCOME FOR THE SAME AMOUNT OF INPUT.

E. THE CONSTRAINTS. THERE ARE TWO PRIMARY CONSTRAINTS UNDER WHICH OUR NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORTS MUST BE CARRIED OUT. FIRST, THERE IS A GREAT RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT TO HAVE FOREIGNERS WORK TOO CLOSELY WITH THEIR POLICE AND OTHER INTERMIL SECURITY FORCES. SECOND, THE WRIT OF KABUL
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IS WEAK IN MANY OF THE REMOTER AREAS OF THE REPUBLIC. THE GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO STRENGTHEN THEIR CENTRAL CONTROL, BUT IN ORDER TO DO SO THEY ARE EXTREMELY RELUNLANT TO CREATE NEW PROBLEMS IN ADDITION TO THOSE THEY ALREADY HAVE, AND AN EXTENSIVE AND EFFICIENT OPIUM ERADICATION EFFORT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY CREATE MANY SUCH DIFFICULTIES.

THESE TWO OVERRIDING CONSTRAINTS DEVELOP FROM THE MANY FACTORS INHERENT IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY: GENERAL SUSPICION OF FOREIGNERS, THE REMOTENESS OF THE PRODUCTION CENTERS (REINFORCED BY POOR OR NON-EXISTENT TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES), THE LACK OF ALTERNATIVE INCOME SOURCES FOR THE GROWERS, THE LOW LEVEL OF THE PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE OF THE MAJORITY OF THE POLICE, AND, FINALLY, THE LOW PRIORITY-RANKING THAT NARCOTICS CONTROL IN THE FIELD GENERALLY RECEIVES UNLESS THERE IS FOREIGN PRODDING. IT IS CLEAR TO THE MISSION THAT WE ARE EMBARKED ON A VERY LONG TERM PROGRAM, AND THAT PROGRESS IN ULTIMATELY CONTROLLING NARCOTICS IS INTIMATELY LINKED TO PROGRESS IN SOCIAL,

ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT.

F. COMMITMENT. PRESIDENT MOHAMMAD DAOUD, FOREIGN MINISTER WAHEED ABDULLAH, JOINT COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MOHAMMAD YAHYA MAROOFI AND MANY OTHER SENIOR GOA OFFICIALS HAVE GIVEN US AND OTHER FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES STRONG STATEMENTS OF THEIR GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO CONTROLLING NARCOTICS PRODUCTION IN THE COUNTRY. WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT THE SINCERITY OF THEIR STATEMENTS OF PERSONAL DISLIKE OF DRUG PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT, ALTHOUGH THE TOP-LEVEL COMMITMENT MAY BE SINCERE, THE PRIORITY ASSIGNED TO ACTUAL ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS MAY BE RATHDR LOW.

THE PRINCIPAL ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE COUNTRY DEALING WITH NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT ARE THE ANTI-SMUGGLING UNITS (ASU'S) OF
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THE MINISTRIES OF INTERIOR AND FINANCE. THE ASU'S CURRENTLY HAVE A COMPLEMENT OF 11 OFFICERS, 31 NCO'S, TWO CLERKS AND TEN DRIVERS DISTRIBUTED INTO SEVERAL REGIONAL TEAMS. THEY HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TWO GERMAN POLICE ADVISORS BY UNFDAC, AND UNFDAC PROVIDES THE MAJORITY OF THE FINANCING. THE ASU'S ARE RESPONSIBLE, HOWEVER, FOR ALL ANTI-SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES, NOT MERELY NARCOTICS, AND THEY DIRECT THEIR EFFORTS TOWARDS TRAFFIC INTERDICTION, RATHER THAN TOWARDS THE PREVENTION AND DESTRUCTION OF PRODUCTION.

THE EXTENSION OF UNFDAC'S AFGHANISTAN PROGRAM IN 1976 REQUIRED THE AFGHANS TO DOUBLE THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO ANTI-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES TO 10,335,000 AFGHANIS (\$189,000 AT THE THEN CURRENT RATE OF EXCHWNGE). ALTHOUGH THIS SUM REPRESENTED AN INCREASE IN RELATIVE TERMS, THE ACTUAL RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THIS EFFORT REMAIN SMALL, AND ARE LARGELY CONFNED TO CONTRIBUTIONS IN KIND (E.G., PERSONNEL, LAND, AND BUILDINGS) THAT DO NOT REPRESENT A MAJOR FINANCIAL OUTLAY FOR THE GOVERNMENT. FURTHERMORE, THE AFGHAN CONTRIBUTION ALSO INCLUDED A COMMITMENT TO EXPAND THE ASU'S BY 75 OFFICERS AND MEN AND ESTABLISH ADDITIONAL REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS; THESE EXPANSIONARY COMMITMENTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN COMPLETELY FULFILLED.

G. ATTITUDES. AS CAN BE SEEN ALREADY, THE GOA'S EXPRESSION OF ANTIPATHY TO NARCOTICS PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING HAS NOT BEEN READILY TRANSLATED INTO ACTRBN. THE RECOGNITION THAT OPIUM PRODUCTION IS A PROBLEM IS EXPRESSED IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS BY MEMBERS OF THE ELITE -- HOWEVER, NO SENIOR OFFICIAL HAS MADE A STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENT (PROBABLY BECAUSE MERE WORDS WOULD NOT BE EFFECTIVE).

THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE DAILY "KABUL TIMES" OCCASIONALLY PRINTS WIRE-SERVICE REPORTS AND FOREIGN SOURCE FEATURES ON INTERNATIONAL DRUG DEALING, AND THE VERNACULAR PRESS SOMETIMES REPORTS THE ARREST OF DRUG SMUGGLERS. WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN, HOWEVER, ANY

REFERENCE TO THE ROLE OF AFGHANISTAN IN THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG
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PICTURE, ANY RECOGNITION THAT THE COUNTRY HAS PROBLEMS TO SOLVE IN THIS AREA, OR REQUESTS THAT CITIZENS ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT AND POLICE IN COMBATTING OPIUM PRODUCTION AND USE (THE GOA WOULD NOT EXPECT THE LATTER TYPE OF PUBLIC APPEAL TO PRODUCE ANY RESULTS).

AFGHANS JUST DO NOT SEE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFIC AS THEIR PROBLEM. EXCEPT IN THE REMOTE PROVINCE OF BADAKHSHAN, ADDICTION IS NOT A MAJOR PROBLEM, AND EVEN THERE, IT IS A SOCIALLY ACCEPTABLE PALLIATIVE FOR PEOPLE WHO ARE FORCED TO LIVE IN A HARSH ENVIRONMENT WITHOUT MEDICAL CARE, WARM CLOTHES OR AN ADEQUATE DIET. AFGHANISTAN DOES, IN ADDITION, RECEIVE SOME SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS FROM THE ILLICIT DRUG TRADE IN TERMS OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE (THEY ALSO SELL CONFISCATED OPIUM), AND THE GOVERNMENT WOULD CREATE SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL AND SECURITY DIFFICULTIES FOR ITSELF WERE IT TO ATTEMPT TO ELIMINATE OPIUM AS A CASH CROP IN MOST OF THE LAWLESS AREAS WHERE IT IS GROWN. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE GOA HAS SET THE PRIORITY FOR OPIUM ERADICATION WELL BELOW THAT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EFFECTIVE CONTROL IN THE RURAL AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, AND THESE TWO OBJECTIVES, AS NOTED ABOVE, ARE FREQUENTLY CONTRIDICTORY IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

WHAT ANTI-NARCOTICS COMMITMENTS AFGHAN OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED STEM FROM PERSONAL OBJECTIONS FOSTERED BY ISLAMIC TEACHINGS (SOME OPIUM FARMERS EVEN CALL IT A "DESPICABLE" CROP) AND FROM STRONG REPRESENTATIONS ON THE PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. SUCH COMMITMENTS WILL BE MAINTAINED AND STRENGTHENED ONLY BY CONTINUED, FORCEFUL INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE AND BY ENCOURAGEMENT THROUGH SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS TO THIS EFFORT BY A BROAD SPECTRUM OF DONORS, DEMONSTRATING THE PRIORITY THAT THESE NATIONS AND AGENCIES GIVE THE PROBLEM.

H. PARTICIPATING U.S. AGENCIES.
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A) EMBASSY: THE PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATING AMERICAN ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN RESTS WITH THE EMBASSY. THIS COORDINATION IS EFFECTED THROUGH THE NARCOTICS CONTROL COUNCIL, WHICH IS CHAIRED BY THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, AND ON WHICH ALL CONCERNED U.S. AGENCIES ARE REPRESENTED. THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE EMBASSY'S EFFORTS HAVE BEEN: (1) TO INCREASE THE AWARENESS OF COMMITMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GOA IN CONTROLLING NARCOTICS PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING IN THE COUNTRY; (2) TO DEVELOP MORE EFFECTIVE USE FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE FUNDS - BOTH DIRECTLY AND THROUGH

INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES - IN THE ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORT HERE; AND, (3) TO ENLIST OTHER NATIONS AND AGENCIES TO JOIN WITH US IN PRESSING THE GOA TO ACT IN THIS AREA, AND IN PROVIDING ADDITIONAL RESOURCES TO ASSIST IN THE EFFORT.

DURING THE PAST YEAR WE CAN POINT TO THE NAMING OF A GOA NARCOTICS COORDINATOR, THE FORMATION OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON AFGHAN NARCOTICS MATTERS, AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF A U.S. EXPERT TO UNFDAC HEADQUARTERS TO ASSIST IN PLANNING CROP SUBSTITUTION AND OTHER PRODUCTION CONTROL PROGRAMS FOR AFGHANISTAN AS ACCOMPLISHMENTS. IN FY 1978 THE EMBASSY HOPES TO SEE THE SCOPE OF THE JOINT COMMISSION'S MANDATE EXPANDED, TO SEE UNFDAC'S UPPER HELMAND PROJECT ACCEPTED BY THE GOA AND FUNDED BY A RANGE OF DONORS, AND TO DEVELOP SOME SMALL SCALE BILATERAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS IN THE TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT AREAS.

B) AID: USAID/AFGHANISTAN HAS NO UNFUNDED PROJECTS. ITS PRINCIPAL EFFORTS IN THE NARCOTICS CONTROL AREA HAS BEEN TO SUPPORT THE US MISSION
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PROGRAM THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-OPIUM SIDE-LETTERS TO APPROPRIATE USAID ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS IN WHICH THE GOA HAS AGREED TO BAN EFFECTIVELY POPPY GROWING IN THOSE SPECIFIED PROJECTS WHICH INCREASE AGRICULTURAL ACREAGE OR IMPROVE EXISTING LANDS. DURING 1977, SUCH AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE DAUG JUI IRRIGATION PROJECT IN KONAR PROVINCE, PHASE II OF THE HELMAND DRAINAGE PROJECT, THE US CONTRIBUTION TO THE AGRICULTURAL LOAN FUND, AND THE BAGHLAN INTEGRATED WHEAT PROJECT.

C) DEA: THE DEA RESIDENT SAIC HAS CHanneled HIS ENERGIES TOWARDS IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE AFGHAN ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES -- PRIMARILY THE ASUS AND THE CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES. HIS MECHANISMS -- PROVIDING, THROUGH UNFDAC, REWARDS FOR INFORMATION LEADING TO NARCOTICS SEIZURES AND TRAINING IN METHODS - ARE WELL-RECEIVED, BUT ARE LIMITED BY THE RESOURCES AT HIS COMMAND. DURING FY 1977 \$37,716 IN REWARDS WERE PAID AS THE RESULT OF THE SEIZURE OF 12,654 KGS OF OPIUM. THE SAIC ALSO CONDUCTED A TWO-WEEK, IN-COUNTRY TRAINING COURSE IN INTELLIGENCE METHODS. DEA HAS NOW AUTHORIZED A SECOND RESIDENT AGENT POSITION IN KABUL, AND IS CONSIDERING THE ASSIGNMENT OF A TRAINING OFFICER IN ITS REGIONAL PARIS OFFICE TO DEVELOP PROGRAMS FOR PROBLEM COUNTRIES LIKE AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND IRAN. (IT IS OUR PROPOSAL (REFTEL G) THAT HE SUPPORT AN UNFDAC

TRAINING OFFICER WE RECOMMEND BE ASSIGNED TO KABUL.)
THE SAIC -- WITH THE EMBASSY'S STRONG ENDORSEMENT -- HAS
REQUESTED DEA AUTHORIZATION TO MAKE MORE FLEXIBLE UNFDAC'S
ADMINISTRATION OF THE REWARD RATE FOR SEIZURES. FINALLY, THE
DEA AGENTS WILL WORK TO IMPROVE AND EXPAND THEIR PERSONAL
TIES WITH AFGHAN POLICE, JUSTICE, AND CUSTOMS OFFICIALS.
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D) USIS: USIS HAS WORKED DURING THE PAST
YEAR TO DEVELOP INTEREST WITHIN THE LOCAL PRESS IN
ARTICLES RELATING TO NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND
CONTROL. USIS HAS ALSO MADE A COUNTRY-WIDE DISTRIBUTION OF
AN ENGLISH-DARI PAMPHLET ABOUT THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM.
ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO SURVEY DATA UPON
WHICH TO BASE AN EVALUATION, AT LEAST SUPERFICIAL
INTEREST AMONG EDITORS AND JOURNALISTS SEEMS TO
HAVE INCREASED. USIS HAS ALSO UTILIZED TWO VIDEO-
TAPES DEALING WITH NARCOTICS MATTERS IN SMALL PRE-
SENTATIONS; IT IS PRESENTLY PREPARING A SERIES OF
RADIO PROGRAMS FOR PLACEMENT WITH RADIO AFGHANISTAN
DURING 1978.

I. OTHER DONORS

A) UNFDAC IS THE PRINCIPAL AGENCY THROUGH
WHICH INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS-RELATED ASSISTANCE
IS CHANNLED TO AFGHANISTAN. THE GOA HAS PREFERRED
THIS APPROACH AND, GIVEN THE SCALE OF THE PROGRAM,
WE TOO HAVE BEEN PLEASED WITH THE RESULTS. THE UN
GRANT FOR FY 1977 WAS \$691,000. THIS PROVIDED
FOR TWO FOREIGN (GERMAN) POLICE ADVISORS, EQUIPMENT,
TRAINING, AND RELATED EXPENSES. IN ADDITION, UN
FUNDS HAVE BEEN USED TO DEVELOP A NUMBER OF PROJECT
PROPOSALS, INCLUDING ONE FOR A TREATMENT CENTER IN
BADA KHSHAN, BORDER POLICE IMPROVEMENT, AND CROP
SUBSTITUTION. AS MENTIONED, UNFDAC HAS PROVIDED
THE ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND ACCESS ROUTE FOR
OUR OWN CROP SUBSTITUTION SPECIALIST. THE NARCOTICS
CONTROL SUGGESTIONS PUT FORTH IN REFS A, D, AND E
WILL BE BEST IMPLEMENTED UNDER THE UN MULTILATERAL
UMBRELLA, AND THUS US FUNDING SHOULD CONTINUE BE DIRECTED
TO UNFDAC FOR THIS PURPOSE. REF B REPRESENTS UNFDAC'S
LATEST THINKING ON THE SUBJECT AND INCLUDES THE
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MISSION'S COMMENTS. BECAUSE WE SEE NO PROSPECT -
OR DESIRABILITY - FOR IMPLEMENTING THIS PROJECT AS
A U.S. DIRECT-ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, WE HAVE NOT DEVELOPED
A SEPARATE PROJECT PROPOSAL. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER,
AS STRESSED IN REFTTEL D, WE WOULD STRONGLY URGE THE

US GOVERNMENT TO BE PREPARED A CONTRIBUTION OF AT LEAST ONE MILLION DOLLARS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT-- THROUGH UNFDAC -- IF SUFFICIENT FUNDS CANNOT BE OBTAINED FROM OTHER DONORS.

B) IRAN IS THE CHIEF CONSUMER OF ILLICIT AFGHAN OPIUM. IT ALSO HAS A SERIOUS ADDICTION PROBLEM, AND HAS SHOWN SIGNS OF WANTING TO TAKE STRONG, POSITIVE MEASURES TO CONTROL SMUGGLING FROM AFGHANISTAN (BUT A RELUCTANCE TO PAY FOR THEM). WE HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED HERE BY THE INTEREST WHICH IRANIAN DIPLOMATS HAVE SHOWN FOR SEVERAL POTENTIAL PROJECTS FOR IRANIAN FUNDING, BOTH IN BADAKHSHAN AND THE HELMAND -- BUT ARE NOT YET CERTAIN WHETHER TEHRAN WILL PRODUCE THE NECESSARY FUNDS. THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS YET TO MAKE A FINANCIAL COMMITMENT OF ANY SORT TO THE NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORT IN AFGHANISTAN, DESPITE REPEATED URGINGS BY US AND UNFDAC REPRESENTATIVES. WE HOPE THAT UNFDAC SECURES THEIR ASSISTANCE FOR THE UPPER HELMAND PROJECT.

C) DENMARK RECENTLY DECIDED TO CONTRIBUTE ALMOST \$400,000 TOWARDS THE CONSTRUCTION OF A HEALTH CARE/ADDICT TREATMENT CENTER--AND SOME SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE--IN BADAKHSHAN THROUGH UNFDAC/UNDP. THE NETHERLANDS HAS ALREADY AGREED TO MAKE A \$500,000 CONTRIBUTION TO THIS PROJECT.
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J. FUTURE OUTLOOK. WITHOUT CONSISTENT AND STRONG INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON THE GOA WE CANNOT EXPECT ANY PROGRESS AT ALL IN THE NARCOTICS FIELD. ENFORCEMENT AGAINST PRODUCERS REMAINS POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY AND SOCIALLY DESTABILIZING, AND THE GOVERNMENT WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO BE MORE INTERESTED IN PROMOTING STABILITY AND ACHIEVING LEGITIMACY THAN IN CONTROLLING NARCOTICS IN AFGHANISTAN. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE, COMBINED WITH, AND SUPPORTED BY, REALISTIC PROPOSALS AND FINANCIAL BACKING, IS THE KEY TO MOTIVATING AND ENABLING THE GOA TO TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION.

THE AFGHAN POLICE CUSTOMS SERVICES HAVE RECENTLY BECOME RELATIVELY MORE EFFICIENT AT NARCOTICS CONTROL. THEY REMAIN LIMITED, HOWEVER, IN MANPOWER, ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT AND LEADERSHIP. WE BELIEVE THAT WITH GREATER SUPPORT BY THE GOA, UNFDAC, AND DEA, THE ASUS CAN BETTER CONTROL THE NARCOTICS TRAFFIC. EFFORTS DIRECTED AT LIMITING PRODUCTION ARE GOING TO BE VERY SELECTIVE, PROBABLY FOCUSING ON HIGHLY VISIBLE GROWING AREAS AND THOSE COVERED BY SPECIFIC ANTI-

POPPY AGREEMENTS. AS A WHOLE, ERADICATION WILL BECOME POLITICALLY PALATABLE ONLY -- IF EVER -- WHEN ACCOMPANIED BY AN ATTRACTIVE CROP SUBSTITUTION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM SUCH AS THE ONE UNFDAC IS SETTING UP FOR THE UPPER HELMAND VALLEY. THIS TAKES TIME, EVEN AFTER IMPLEMENTATION BEGINS -- AND IMPLEMENTATION REMAINS DISTANT. PROSPECTS LOOK GOOD FOR IMPROVED ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKERS IN THE SHORT RUN. WE ARE BEGINNING TO SEE SIGNS OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A LONG-TERM ERADICATION PROGRAM.

K. RECOMMENDED WASHINGTON ACTION. THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT THE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER WASHINGTON
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AGENCIES SUPPORT BOTH A SHORT TERM PROGRAM DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE ABILITY OF THE ASUS TO INTERDICT NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS, AND LONGER TERM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT/CROP SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMS THAT WILL BE NECESSARY IF AFGHANISTAN IS EVER TO REDUCE SIGNIFICANTLY ITS LEVEL OF OPIUM PRODUCTION. SPECIFICALLY, WE RECOMMEND:

A) THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL MID-LEVEL FSO TO EMBASSY KABUL WORK AS A FULL-TIME MISSION NARCOTICS CONTROL OFFICER (REF F);

B) DEA'S APPROVAL OF SAIC HURLEY'S PROPOSAL TO MODERNIZE THE PROCEDURES UNDER WHICH FUNDS ARE JOVIDED TO UNFDAC FOR REWARDS FOR INFORMATION LEAD-IN TO SEIZURES;

C) INCREASED SUPPORT FOR UNFDAC'S LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM IN AFGHANISTAN. WASHINGTON SHOULD ENCOURAGE UNFDAC TO EXPAND THIS PROGRAM AS RAPIDLY AS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE GOA'S ABILITY TO ABSORB THE ASSISTANCE;

D) MAJOR SUPPORT FOR THE UNFDAC CROP-REPLACEMENT/INCOME-SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM. THE USG SHOULD STRONGLY ENCOURAGE OTHER DONORS TO PARTICIPATE, BUT SHOULD BE READY, IF NECESSARY, TO CONTRIBUTE NOT LESS THAN ONE MILLION DOLLARS TO THE DIRECT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT (THROUGH UNFDAC);

E) THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT UNFDAC'S SEARCH FOR ADDITIONAL DONORS FOR NARCOTICS CONTROL ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN, BOTH TO INCREASE THE
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AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND TO BROADEN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE TO WHICH THE GOA MUST REACT. WE ARE SPECIFICALLY CONCERNED WITH IRAN (WHERE WE BELIEVE A SPECIAL EFFORT IS JUSTIFIED), BUT BELIEVE A BROADZR APPROACH WOULD BE APPROPRIATE;

F) U.S. AGENCIES AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SHOULD CONTINUE TO RECOMMEND AND ENCOURAGE THE ATTACHMENT OF SIDE-AGREEMENTS OR CLAUSES BANNING OPIUM PRODUCTION TO APPROPRIATE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK HAS TENTATIVELY DECIDED TO INCLUDE SUCH A CLAUSE IN A LOAN AGREEMENT IT IS CONSIDERING IN THE SERAJ REGION, AND HOPE THAT MORE INTERNATIONAL DONORS WILL FOLLOW THE ADB'S LEAD IN THIS ACTION.

G) THE EMBASSY'S RECOMMENDATION THAT IN-COUNTRY TRAINING FOR AFGHAN NARCOTICS OFFICIALS AND PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS BE INCREASED (REFTEL G) SHOULD RECEIVE EXPEDITIOUS CONSIDERATION. AMSTUTZ UNQUOTE VANCE

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Message Attributes

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Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
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Executive Order: 11652 GDS
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Type: TE
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